The enemy's intelligence apparatus and methods

The immoral wars waged by the Zionist occupation against Gaza and its inhabitants from time to time, in which all international prohibitions are used, put the world in amazement when it sees the killing of innocent children in their bedrooms, on their beds, or in their places of fun and games in the alleys, streets, squares, and schools. Killing of pregnant women, infants, and women with large families, along with the elderly and young men, is systematic, programmed and planned killing. They want to kill the Palestinian womb in order to achieve the declared Zionist goal that accompanies every Zionist attack, which is “changing the security situation in the Palestinian south,” meaning the elimination of Hamas and the resistance, and the creation of a cooperative and collaborative security situation He defends the Zionist offspring at the expense of the Palestinian offspring, as happened with the Lebanese Lahd forces in southern Lebanon and what is happening in the West Bank, meaning that the real goal is “employment or extermination”, and from here it becomes clear to us what is happening in secret and behind the scenes away from incendiary missiles and Bleeding waterfalls and destroyed homes in Gaza, the Zionist intelligence or the so-called Shin Bet launch brazen and quiet attacks on the Palestinian people in general and the Gazans in particular through direct contacts, in deliberate and random ways, with people of both sexes and of different ages and various professional disciplines, with a focus on the sons of The resistance factions with the aim of overthrowing them, obtaining accurate intelligence information, destabilizing the internal ranks, sowing seeds of suspicion and strife among the citizens, and weakening the morale of the invading Palestinian people, represented by their support and protection for the Palestinian resistance leadership and government. And the Zionist enemy usually divides the Gaza Strip into cities, villages, camps, and regions. Each region is handled by a Zionist intelligence officer who is fluent in the Arabic language and specializes in psychology and its characteristics, in addition to his knowledge of the nature of the Palestinian person and his current conditions and needs. He contacts the Palestinian citizens, offering them to deal through the previously known means of dropping money and wealth. Threat and intimidation, providing educational, health and economic services, providing respectable job opportunities, providing drugs and harnessing prostitutes, polishing and raising status such as leadership and leadership, taking revenge on opponents by supplying him with weapons and money (taking advantage of the enmity and hatred of the Palestinians towards each other), and other various and different means that are commensurate with Each victim, its time and place, so he presents it to the citizens via telephone calls directly or through some female soldiers who impersonate Arab names from different countries or from the villages of the Palestinian interior, in order to recruit more agents and strike with them the home front, weakening its strength, shattering its morale and weakening its resistance, and his interests are directed towards the parties border areas to secure its side and intensify communications in the northern, eastern and southern border areas of the Gaza Strip more than in the center and west. The Palestinian side in front of these communications will be of the following types:

1- Turn off the phone directly without entering into a discussion or inquiry. 2- Allow the officer to speak and present his temptations, then the Palestinian will pour out his anger and lava on him. 4- He responds to the Zionist officer and promises him to implement what he wants, then he conveys what happened with him to his relatives, friends, and to those in command with the aim of guidance and advice. 5- He responds with him with the aim of obtaining the aforementioned privileges, especially money, without implementing what the officer wants. The intelligence prepares him, but he does nothing and remains confused and afraid. He does not reveal anything to anyone. He lives in a tense psychological atmosphere that affects his behavior and emotions. He quickly collapses and reveals, but in limited personal circles. Which ranges between 18-40 years, according to the nature of this group and its needs (study, marriage, home, work, food, medicine, travel,...), and this group, especially 18-25, is considered the fuel for the military resistance action and increased the resistance organizations with the aim of penetrating them Knowing its plans, formations, and equipment is also in line with the nature of this stage of love of display, boasting, and curiosity. Thus, we find the Zionist enemy not tired of launching successive security campaigns to overthrow what it can overthrow. Nevertheless, its campaigns will fail just as its military campaigns failed before, as the people The Palestinian is experiencing an unprecedented national Islamic awakening, and he seemed to know well his goal in light of the collapse of surrender projects and the exposing of treacherous projects, and the awakening of the popular conscience of Western, Islamic and international nations towards the Palestinian cause. Many times, it must be ignored and telephone technology should be used to ignore it, in addition to exposing it and speaking frankly about it without fear or fear, and handing over phone numbers to the specialists (security authorities) who know how to deal with them and educate people about their truth, especially in open media and through sermons, preaching words, lectures, and even through speech Public visits in family visits and youth gatherings, in addition to monitoring and follow-up of young men and women by their families and guardians, especially if there has been a change in their personal lives, and taking advantage of the opportunity of the national anti-intelligence campaign that is sponsored by the security authorities of the Palestinian government, which has experience and know-how, which deals with the event with high security professionalism and provides material and moral support for the Palestinian people.

The Israeli Military Intelligence “Aman”: Origins, Development and its Relationship with the Israeli Army

Introduction

The Military Intelligence Division “Aman” is considered the most important among the Israeli security agencies for the great role it plays in shaping the political decision in Israel through what is called the issue of national assessment, which lays down the required vision for Israeli policies based on the information provided by “Aman”.

AMAN’s influence and prestige remained significant until the October 1973 war, when the Agranat Committee, which investigated the results of the war, demanded that the assessments of other agencies be taken into account so that AMAN would not be singled out by its position and that the political leadership would have broader options in challenging its positions on various issues.

The importance of “Aman” also stems from its name, which is also linked to the Israeli army, which is considered the most powerful institution in the Hebrew state and has the ability and influence in all aspects of life in it. Therefore, despite the recommendations of the Agranat Committee, its assessments are important, and it is still issuing semi-annual and annual reports that receive wide attention Various Israeli circles deal with it with analysis and commentary.

For the aforementioned reasons and others, the researcher deals with the establishment of this apparatus, its development, and its relationship with the Israeli army. Its different stages of development and the beginning of its establishment are considered necessary to understand the nature of the work of this apparatus and its various sections, as each chief left his clear fingerprints on it in one way or another.

It is not possible to separate the development of the apparatus from the struggle of the apparatus, and the fact that some of them lurked around each other in order to possess most of the security papers in their hands, which is evidenced by the Mossad’s refusal to carry out “Aman” missions outside the borders of the Hebrew state, except for neighboring countries, and the objection of its chief, Israel Harel, to the transfer of Unit 131 to him, and the exploitation of the Lavon scandal, and then The Night Awakening Unit Hence, the research deals with these two issues in detail with an attempt to identify its different sections, and the stages of development of “Aman” and the impact of its successive presidents on its development.

Chapter One: Military Intelligence before the establishment of the State of Israel

Chapter Two: Military Intelligence After the Establishment of the State of Israel:

1. Military Intelligence Service (Esser Perry era)

2. The trial and removal of the head of the military intelligence service

3. An intelligence department in the southern region

4. Intelligence services and the Israeli army

5. Intelligence under Chaim Herzog

6. Military Intelligence during the era of Benjamin Jebli

7.From an intelligence department to an intelligence division (the era of Jehoshaphat Harkabi)

Chapter Three: Active Intelligence Arms and Operations

* Unit 131 and Operation Susanna (Lavon scandal)

* Wired monitoring

* Establishment of the Intelligence Research and Assessment Department

* Military intelligence against the resistance

* Military Intelligence assassinates Mustafa Hafez and Fatah leaders in Beirut

* “Unit 8200” is the electronic espionage arm of the Intelligence Division

Chapter Four: The administrative and organizational structure of the Intelligence Division

Chapter One: Military Intelligence before the establishment of the State of Israel

It is not possible to assert with certainty the existence of a military intelligence service before the establishment of the State of Israel on 5/15/1948 in the sense that bore this meaning after the inception and the issuance of a decision to organize the Israeli security services on 6/30/1948. That the functions of the Military Intelligence Service existed, albeit narrowly, within the framework of the unorganized groups in the “Shay” intelligence service of the “Hagana” organization.

During the 1948 war, the so-called combat intelligence apparatus was crystallized, which was a direct continuation of the Haganah “Shay” units, the Palmach reconnaissance units, and a group of enthusiasts who worked in this field, such as Zobabel Darman (Arbil), known as “Chevab.”

In the Jokera settlement in 1941, Chevab learned for the first time during the class commanders course [1] how to write the enemy part in an acceptable form for an operational order, which separates the intelligence data about the enemy they intend to attack, such as: the number of its fighters, the quantities of weapons it possesses, pictures of its deployment, and capabilities available to him and the extent to which he used the upholsterers, and so on.

Chevab was surprised that there were no files of this kind on the Galilee region, so it suggested to its commander, Yisrael Ben Eliyahu, to set up two reconnaissance units under his command, to tour the front of the Jordan Valley and Gush HaGilboa to collect information about the region and put it in files that include information on groups, ammunition and organizations inside the Palestinian villages, and to form a picture correct intelligence.

When Chevab presented the files he had prepared to Yigal Yadin, who was then head of the Operations Division of the Haganah's regional command, he immediately asked him to organize, together with Shmuel (Zaima) Depot, the first intelligence course. The intelligence file), which did not include data on the enemy, but rather its military strength. A biannual intelligence officer course was held in Hadera in 1946. Its members learned for the first time, most of them from Hishai officers, the Arabic language and gained experiences from people familiar with Arab life in Palestine.

The course in Shafia and the semi-annual one in Hadera laid the foundations for the combat intelligence apparatus in the Israeli army in the 1948 war. Graduates of these two courses participated in the jobs of intelligence officers in the brigades that fought in the battles in the 1948 war and applied the theories they acquired on nature [2].

Days after the decision to partition Palestine issued on 11/29/1947, Yigal summoned Yadin Chevvab and asked him to quickly organize an urgent intelligence course that was held in the house of the Histadrut members in Tel Aviv, but battles broke out during it, and Chevab refused Yadin’s proposal to head combat intelligence in Chief of Staff of the Haganah, and a request for national employment as an intelligence officer in a field unit. Yadin responded to him, as Chevab worked in rounds of war without professional intelligence direction and without focus in the northern West Bank, Galilee, and the Lebanese depth.

In March 1948, after the road to Jerusalem was closed, Chevab found himself a brigade intelligence officer in the “Nakhshon” operation, which aimed to occupy Jerusalem and break the siege on the Jewish neighborhood in it. There was little information received from Arab agents and informants, so he chose to get quick information about the contractor. The Palestinian through aerial reconnaissance, so the “Haganah” put at his disposal a reconnaissance plane, and he spent long hours in air tracking operations for the Arab checkpoints that were set up on the roads and for the number of people who were placed to guard these checkpoints. And sometimes Chevab would put the information he collected in a nylon bag and throw it in a nylon bag from the air on the Israeli forces on the ground.

Chapter Two: Military Intelligence after the establishment of the State of Israel

1. Military Intelligence Service (Esser Berry era):

On 6/30/1948 a meeting of the “Shay” leadership was held, chaired by the tea leader, Isser Berry, to which a tea leader in Jerusalem, Benjamin Jabali, a tea leader in the north, Ibrahim Kidron, and a tea leader in Tel Aviv, Yusor Helfrin, Boris Goriel, and David Karoff were invited. .

Berry informed the audience that David Ben-Gurion had decided, with the establishment of the state, that the intelligence service should be reorganized. He even approved a new organizing program presented to him by Esser Berry himself, and based on the program, the secret services would operate in the country as of (30/6/1948) in Three-section framework [3]:

A- Military intelligence services headed by Esser Perry.

b- A secret political department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that collects material from abroad, headed by Boris Goriel.

C- Department of Internal Security (Shirot Batahoun St.), headed by Helferin (Harel).

Also on the thirtieth of June, an order was issued by the General Staff, signed by the Chief of Staff, Yigal Yadin, stipulating the dissolution of the “Tana” services, which is the code name for the “news services” of the Haganah “Shay”, and the establishment of military intelligence services. The new intelligence was assigned four areas of responsibility she:

1. combat intelligence.

2. Operations security.

3. Counter espionage.

4. eavesdropping and surveillance.

The order stated that the new intelligence will be directed to the Staff Division of the General Staff of the Israeli Army, and Perry is authorized, on behalf of the Chief of Staff, to deal with the issue of liquidating “tons” and organize methods of providing information to the fighting forces during the transitional period and to study all intelligence issues in the field units.

2. The trial and removal of the head of military intelligence services:

Counterespionage and field security, which were under the responsibility of Military Intelligence, made Esser Peri and his deputy, Binyamin Gebli, focus on what was related to the subject of espionage. They suspected that Meir Tobyansky, a senior employee of the Jerusalem Electricity Company who was a commander in the Haganah, had handed over a list of vital elements. In Jerusalem and the arms factories to the British, he ordered his arrest and was interrogated in the presence of Berry and three of his assistants. Topiansky was brought to trial in an abandoned house, and on the first day of the court a decision was issued to execute him, and that was executed by firing squad.

Ali Qassem, an Arab informant, was also accused of being a double agent and a traitor, so Berry ordered his execution. When his body was found and David Ben-Guron learned, he ordered an investigation, removed Berry and brought him to trial after six months of his tenure as head of the Military Intelligence Service.

Berry was accused of presenting perverted documents in August 1948 to David Ben-Gurion related to the betrayal of Aba Hushi, or of arresting Gul Mister, one of Aba Hushi's aides, for a period of 76 days to confess treason, but that did not lead to his dismissal, but when it became clear in January 1949 after Months after he was expelled from his position, and after the results of the investigation related to the fake documents were presented, Berry was asked to leave the Israeli army and his military rank, the rank of lieutenant colonel, was withdrawn from him. In October 1949, when he was arrested and brought to trial because of the Tobiansky case, Berry was sentenced to individual imprisonment for only one day [4].

3. Intelligence department in the southern region:

The Military Intelligence Service was established for the first time after the establishment of a large intelligence department in the southern region that included a staff that gained experience in dealing with land and enemy issues, administration and the rest of the intelligence fields. From this department, daily intelligence reports and a weekly report flowed, and similar reports were sent to the Chief of Staff.

The main role of the intelligence department during the 1948 war in the southern front was the collection of information by means of air sorties, observations and monitoring at the tactical level. This task was carried out by Mordechai Ben-Zur. The commander of the southern front at the time, Yigal Allon, used the intelligence officer Chevab to persuade David Ben-Urion during his visit to the front. With the ability of the Israeli army to defeat the Egyptian army and inflict a fatal blow on it, and it succeeded in that and agreed from Gurion to start the “Joab” campaign in the Negev region.

In the first battles that took place within the framework of Joab's campaign, many prisoners and documents were arrested, including two folders that contained the names of all officers in the Egyptian army, their personal information, and the method of their promotion. This discovery was like a gold mine for the intelligence department in the southern front, and during his visits The frequent imprisonment of prisoners, Chevab was interrogating Egyptian officers after he had taken care in advance of memorizing their names and finding what was written about them in the officers’ book, and the result was that the officers were forced to talk about everything they knew, and it is understood that in this way there was no problem in obtaining From Egyptian prisoners of war on the necessary information about the Egyptian army forces, in the Negev at the height of Operation Joab.

After the end of the 1948 war with the signing of the armistice agreements, there was a significant decline in the importance that the army leaders attributed to strategic intelligence at the level of the Chief of Staff, which was first called the Intelligence Service and then the Intelligence Department. In the Israeli army, he even appointed General Haim Laskub as head of the Israeli army command, and demanded the need to develop combat intelligence and pay attention to its rapid progress in all units of the Israeli army.

4. Intelligence services and the Israeli army[5]:

The meeting that was held on 30/6/1948, during which the first process of organizing the Israeli apparatus took place under the direct supervision of Acer Berry and orders from David Ben-Gurnon, created a problem in the subordination of the intelligence services, as it was clear that its reports would be submitted to the political leadership, which created a disagreement with the The Staff Division of the Chiefs of Staff, which saw that the intelligence services should fall under its responsibility.

The intelligence officer in the Navy was one of those who objected to the status of the intelligence services. This came in a letter he sent to the Chief of Staff, Gael Yadin, in the Chief of Staff, to which he wrote in response:

1. The Navy is under the supervision of intelligence departments responsible for security, surveillance, and counterintelligence operations.

2. In everything related to combat intelligence, the two services will work through coordination between them and they must exchange the information available to them.

3. The Chief of Intelligence and the Marine Corps Intelligence Officer meet to agree on the details of the said matter.

There was an intelligence confrontation that took place in September 1948 between Military Intelligence and the Research Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and this confrontation forced Yigal Yadin to draw up a document that clearly defined the powers of each party. Intelligence Service and Research Service

1. The Intelligence Service is solely responsible for collecting information and decoding it in everything related to military areas, whether in strategic matters or in operational operational matters.

2. The Research Department is also concerned with the aforementioned political and military issues.

3. All activities of the agents outside the Israeli borders are placed in the hands of the research department, with the exception of the Arabists.

4. Activities behind lines by non-Jewish Arab units are carried out only by the Operations Division and the Research Department. Activities behind enemy lines by Jewish units are carried out by the Staff Division and Military Intelligence. In both cases, mutual consultations take place.

5. Contacts with the Druze, Circassians and others, are carried out only by the commander of the minority unit of the Staff Division and representatives of the research department. The activities of the intelligence service in this field must be carried out only with the knowledge and approval of the commander of the minority unit.

6. The two parties shall cooperate with each other in the exchange of information.

7. Fixed meetings are held weekly for the heads of services with the Chief of the Staff Division.

5. Intelligence under Chaim Herzog:

Esser Berry, after the establishment of the Intelligence Corps and the dissolution of the “Tana Services” of the Haganah, appointed Haim Herzog as his deputy with the same rank of “Lieutenant Colonel.” Berry outlined in front of Herzog a summary of the intelligence’s work by collecting information and converting it into intelligence.

Herzog did not waste time. On the following day, he held individual meetings with everyone who was scheduled to head the armed forces to determine the appropriate cadre and system for him. The result was that in less than two months, the great Yusr and Haim Herzog went out to the General Staff building in Ramat Gan to present There, in front of the senior leadership, the first formational system for intelligence, which was approved on August 20, 1948.

The system included four positions for the intelligence services of the Staff Division in the Presidency of the General Staff[6]:

1. Establishing an apparatus that collects information about the enemy, its forces, the building and distribution of its weapons, its intentions and activities, its military industries and its military effort, its morale, stability and internal and external discipline.

2. Manufacture and utilize information, collaborate and exchange information with intelligence services not subject to the military.

3. Convey information at the required speed to all relevant leaders whose activities the information may affect.

4. Preventing information from leaking to the enemy about our forces and their organization, or our war effort in all its forms, by establishing military surveillance, field security, and a counter-espionage network.

And about half a year later, that is, on the twenty-fourth of March, and after Herzog assumed command of intelligence, succeeding Esser Perry shortly before, the first system was canceled and replaced by a new system that formed the basis for building the intelligence force in the following years. At that time, the name of the Intelligence Services (S.A.M.) will disappear and it will be divided into two main creatures that are in fact one body: a weapon like other weapons with staff units on the one hand, and a department in the Chief of Staff subordinate to the Staff Division on the other hand.

According to Herzog's proposal, the intelligence department in the Chief of Staff was divided into divisions, referred to by the symbol "MODE", and the division was as follows:

Mod 1. Led by Benjamin Jebli and includes the combat intelligence and the research unit that was working on manufacturing and evaluating information. This section was formed from different seats according to countries: the Jordanian seat, the Syrian seat, the Egyptian seat, and the like.

Mod 2. Led by Mordechai Warsman (Moh) and included the eavesdropping unit.

Mod 3. It was led by Avraham Kidron and included a field security unit.

Mod 4. It is concerned with all issues of military, political and economic control (evasion of agents and others), and it was led by the first military observer, Gertson Dror, who was responsible for contacts with the press by virtue of an agreement signed with the Journalists Syndicate in 1948.

Mod 5. It was interested in collecting information from Arabic newspapers and other exposed Arab publications. It was headed by Mordechai Ben Zur, and with the help of various donors, a luxurious library of intelligence services was established, which also included professional books in different languages, except for Arabic, that talk about intelligence services in around the world.

Mod 6-7. Led by Dr. Reifenburg Lutz, Wafik and others, his field of work was to collect information related to maps and aerial photographs.

Mod 8. It was led by Haim Ba'ari and included the technical unit that was concerned with technological development and preparation of documents.

Mod 9. Led by Meir de Shalat, it is concerned with the military attaches, the first of whom was the American military attaché who arrived in Israel in October 1948.

Mod 10. It was given the name (Special Functions Officer) and worked on the use of clients - across the lines.

Mod 18. It was led by Shmarya Gottsman and included a unit of intruders that worked in Arab countries (and it only worked for a short time).

6. Military Intelligence during the era of Benjamin Jabali[7]:

When Benjamin Gebli assumed the position of Chief of the Intelligence Department at the General Staff, succeeding Haim Herzog in April 1950, the department faced three urgent tasks:

a. Reorganization of the collection device, on a modern and advanced basis.

b. Completion of the regulatory frameworks for weapons that began to take shape particularly during Herzog's tenure.

T. The development of the research apparatus, which scrutinized the information collected and distributed intelligence estimates to its various consumers.

Jebelly attached great importance to the completion of the first task, and was even more attracted to it because of his nature, and for this reason he worked to invest most of his time in restoring and repairing the information gathering apparatus, in the Intelligence Department and the Intelligence Corps, in order to work again in another round of battles with the Arabs, at that time In the early fifties, it was believed in Israel that this round would not be long in coming.

During the 1948 war, many collection sources were closed, especially with regard to the Egyptian and Syrian fronts. Arab newspapers stopped reaching Israel, and Jews who were fluent in the Arabic language could no longer travel to Egypt and work there. The movement of emigration from Egypt began, and the activities of many seasoned agents who also worked during the “Shay” period in this and other facades stopped, as during the war their contacts with Israeli intelligence were cut off and were not renewed after that.

Mod 10, which was recruiting and using agents across the lines, actually continued its work on the various fronts, but its activities were limited only to easy missions (near the borders), while the Egyptian front moved away, and the risks involved in crossing the borders to Egypt increased, and the quality of the information it received Customers brought in from across the border was very poor.

7. From an intelligence department to an intelligence division (the era of Jehoshaphat Harkabi)[8]:

The process of organizing the Israeli army in the years that followed the establishment of the State of Israel did not go beyond the intelligence corps. In December 1953, the intelligence department was given the status of an independent division in the Chief of Staff, after the British structure of the Israeli army was replaced by the French structure consisting of four divisions, which retains an independent status for intelligence On December 28, 1953, Lieutenant-Colonel Yehoshaphat Harkabi (who at that time was acting head of the Intelligence Department, succeeding Benjamin Gebli, who was on a year-long study abroad vacation) sent a special message to the intelligence men, in which he said:

Today, the Intelligence Department has separated from the Staff Division and has become an independent division in the Chief of Staff called the Intelligence Division. This change came to highlight the importance of the intelligence weapon of the Israeli army. Changing the status with all that it entails is a decisive step on the path of our development, and there is no similar work Except for what was done at the beginning of the establishment of intelligence in the Israeli army.

This goal of intelligence constitutes for us the basis for the security and existence of the “state”, and we must always keep this goal in our eyes and in the light of it we must walk, and our ears must be attentive to everything that is going on around us, and our eyes must be open and our mind wide and open to understand every matter on Its truth, and we must have love for each other and fanaticism for intelligence and continue to carry out our duties to the fullest.

On the eve of the transformation of the Intelligence Department into a division in the Presidency of the Staff, the size of the Intelligence Corps did not exceed a thousand people. About 200 officers and soldiers served in the Intelligence Department in the Presidency of the General Staff (including the research officer) and about 600 people served in the various arms units.

The following details may show, in general terms, the shape of the building of the Intelligence Department on the eve of its transformation into a division in the Presidency of the General Staff, as the Intelligence Department gathered in its own hands the following functions[9]:

There is no doubt that one of the elements that contributed to the support and development of military intelligence within the framework of the intelligence group was the research department that was operating within it, and was particularly responsible for providing national intelligence assessments, and from the moment that military intelligence became responsible for making assessments There was no escape from the national intelligence's penetration into political fields as well, and here the circle of research shrank until it reached a situation in which it had only very little human energy.

During the work of Chaim Herzog for the Intelligence Department, the foundations for research work were laid, and the research apparatus worked on the method of (seats), where each seat deals with the affairs of an independent Arab state. Most of the researchers came from the academic world and emerged among the first group of researchers, the relatively large number, Those who are of Western European origin, they covered up the lack of mastery of the Arabic language with the ability to comprehend, excellent analysis, and sound motives.

During the battles, the military units were fed directly from the combat intelligence and did not wait until the search evaluations arrived at the level of the Chief of Staff, and the role of the research men was limited to collecting data that reached them from individual collection sources (especially from agents and later from monitoring) about the forces The enemy, its preparations, and the weapons it possesses, and on the basis of these data, they used to write daily and weekly reports.

The unit of agents was providing information in particular about the eastern front, and based on its reports, the research men were preparing lists about the preparations of the Arabs in the various villages, such as: Beit Jibrin - 50 armed men, 70 rifles and machine guns, and so on.

Chapter Three: Active Intelligence Arms and Operations

Unit 131 and Operation Susanna (Lavon scandal)[10]:

Israel passed in 1953 and 1954 in severe distress, depression, fear of the coming, and difficult internal circumstances. In November of 1953, Prime Minister and Minister of Defense David Ben-Gurion resigned from his posts and moved to live in Kibbutz (Sde Boker) in the Negev. Fears prevailed both in The government or among the Israeli public could not his successor in the prime minister, Moshe Sharett, and in the Ministry of Defense, Pinhas Libon, occupy their place as it should, and on the border, there was a decrease in the number of infiltration operations into Israel, but the new defense minister wanted to prove that he is no less firm than his predecessor.

The international situation for Israel at that time was complicated, as the Soviet Union turned into a hostile superpower, Britain intended to remove its forces from the Suez Canal area, and the American administration under President Dwight Eisenhower denied Israel according to the Israeli vision as a result of the contacts it made with the good regime In Egypt, under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser and his young officers, after the (Free Officers) movement seized power in Egypt in a bloodless coup and deposed King Farouk from the throne on July 23, 1952. Ben-Gurion and Moshe Dayan said that time is running against Israel, and that sooner or later Arab countries will try to restore their dignity and prestige, which were damaged in the 1948 war, and Ben-Gurion and Dayan believed that the Arab armies would return to fight another round of war, so it is better to anticipate that and implement an initiative by Israel at a time to be determined, before Egypt arms itself as expected. .

This was the basis for the plan that was prepared in the Intelligence Division of the Israeli army in those days. According to that plan, members of a espionage and sabotage network composed of young Jews would work and carry out a series of operations in cinemas, public institutions, and American and British institutions in Cairo and Alexandria. With the aim of destabilizing the regime of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and in order to discredit Abdel Nasser so that the West would see him, present his regime as unstable, and sabotage the developed relations between him and Western countries. Pushing the United States to reduce its relationship with Egypt and pushing the British not to remove their forces from the Suez Canal area.

The task was entrusted to Unit No. (131), which was established in 1948 and was called at that time (Hakkar / 2) within the framework of the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was considered the most secret unit in the department, which was headed by (Boris Goriel). This unit initiates sabotage and propaganda operations (black) - (psychological warfare) behind enemy lines.

In 1949, Prime Minister and Minister of Defense David Ben-Gurion decided to transfer the unit (Hakar / 2) to the intelligence department. Herzog, that Hakar 2 missions are more appropriate for a military unit rather than a civilian unit.

It was decided in the Military Intelligence to make changes to the structure of (Hakkar / 2) and to establish two units in its place, No. 131 and 132, and most of its men were from the Navy Company of the Palmakh, from which the Naval Commando Unit / 13 developed.

Unit 132's mission was to carry out psychological warfare operations. For example, agents from this unit in 1952 published anti-monarchy propaganda materials in the streets of Cairo, said (Yehosphat (Bati) Harkabi), a senior officer at the time in the Intelligence Division. After that, the head of the Intelligence Division and one of those who adopted Avri El-Ad, in that one of the tasks of the unit was to publish a picture (photograph) showing King Farouk in bed with one of the women, but the task was not successful.

At the head of the unit in which Avri Elad was summoned to serve was Lieutenant Colonel (Mordechai Motka) Ben Zur), who devised in 1951 the idea of ​​establishing secret networks of agents in Egypt, and they were to be (sleeper) agents, and be used At the time of need, and what is meant at the time of need is the outbreak of war, and the tasks were scheduled to be sabotage operations in strategic facilities, such as bridges, power stations, army camps, and roads, and in order to establish the network in Egypt, Major Abraham Dar was recruited to the unit[11].

At the beginning of the summer of 1951, (Dar) arrived to his new mission in Egypt, and he was carrying in his pocket a British passport under the name (John Durling), and he disguised himself as a businessman originally from Aden, and in 1952 (Dar) recruited in Alexandria and Cairo a group of The Jewish youths were students of the Zionist Youth Movement, who were enthusiastic and exemplary. Neither the leader “Ben-Zur” nor “Dar” could accurately define the group's mission and talked with them about many tasks: espionage and information gathering, assistance in illegal immigration of Jews and carrying out operations disruptive.

In August of 1951, he left Dar Misr and left behind two cells of the network in Alexandria and Cairo. Each cell had a radio, through which orders to work were to be received from the leadership of the unit in Israel. The two cells were independent and no cell members were known. The other cell or even the existence of another cell, except that inside each cell they knew each other, and during 1952 and 1953 the members of the two cells were transferred to France and then to Israel, and they received in Jaffa a series of trainings on the use of equipment, radio, espionage and ship identification, and they were not At what stage was it explained to them how they would act if they were discovered and arrested, and after the members of the network returned from Israel to Egypt after the training, they began to buy various materials from pharmacies from which they could prepare explosive devices, and other materials were smuggled to them from Israel, under orders from Tel Aviv Network members set up a small factory to prepare explosive devices.

On September 11, 1954, the trial of members of the spy network began in a military court in Cairo. Two of them, Shmuel Azer and Dr. Moshe Marzouk, were sentenced to death. The death sentence was actually executed on January 31, 1955 by hanging, while The rest were sentenced to different prison terms, and among the detainees was also (Meir (Max) Bent), a major in the Intelligence Division of the Israeli army, who worked as an intelligence agent in Tehran and Baghdad, and in 1951 he joined Unit (31).

"Lavon", who realized that he was no longer trusted by most of the ministers, also resigned on the basis of his inclination to authorize the Israeli army to carry out a retaliatory operation, sometimes without the knowledge of Prime Minister Moshe Sharett, and without obtaining his approval, and he returned in his place on The Ministry of Defense, David Ben-Gurion, and the head of the Intelligence Division, “Benjamin Ghibli,” was forced to resign from his position, and his deputy, Yehoshafat Harkabi, replaced him. The network is in Egypt, and because of the support and coverage given by El-Ad to those responsible for him, Ghibli returned the favor to him and before he decided to resign from his post, he sent him again to Germany with the same identity as Paul Frank.

Wire monitoring:

Monitoring phone calls made by the confrontation countries with Israel posed a dilemma represented by the need to cross the border to install a device for prominent or limited and underground telephone or telegraph lines in the military zone of those countries, and the maintenance of the monitoring device required crossing the border more than once to conduct checks and replace the batteries.

The former head of the Intelligence Division, Benjamin Jabali, says that the Minister of Defense at the time, Pinhas Lavon, met several times with the Chief of Staff, Moshe Dayan, and with him to discuss the use of the monitoring device, and the restrictions that impede its use, and it was decided in this meeting to allow its use in the Syrian front [12] during 1954 .

The aforementioned device was prepared to connect to a high telephone line that was extended between Syrian sites in the Golan Heights, and the necessity called for connecting one end of the cable to the telephone wire fixed to the head of the column, and its other end to the lower end of the device hidden in the ground, and a group of military intelligence consisting of Five people on this task during the night more than once.

Ensuring the validity of the device’s operation required the middle of the night, when it was quiet and most of the Syrian soldiers woke them up so that the phone lines would work, which required that some members of the group fire light fire and bombs at the Syrian site and then withdraw while the rest of the members of the group that breaks near the monitoring device wait and watch. On phone calls and make sure the device is working.

There was fear that the intelligence group might be discovered by the Syrian soldiers, which happened on the night of December 8, 1954, and when they became near a Syrian position, they were fired upon, and a Syrian unit surrounded them and they fell into captivity.

During interrogation with the group, he confessed that the aim of their operation inside the Syrian territories was to spy on the Syrian army, and one of them committed suicide, while the other four members of the group were exchanged for 140 Syrian prisoners in March 1956. The members of the group who called were killed, which required that some members of the group open fire. Light and bombs on th site

One of the members of the group tried to detonate the monitoring device that was installed after discovering their order, but the booby-trapped device did not explode because of the moisture.

This case sparked widespread controversy and mutual accusations between different parties in the Israeli arena, and a question about the feasibility of sending the intelligence group and risking discovery.

Department of Intelligence Research and Estimation:

The more time passed since the end of the war, the more the combat intelligence men lost their prestige and greatness. In the intelligence department in Ramat Gan, the men of the “Egyptian seat” discovered that, apart from information received from the media, they knew nothing of what was going on in Egypt.

Jebelly set out to reform the information gathering apparatus in the Intelligence Corps, and his immediate goal behind that was to search for new sources of information and obtain, as much as possible, information about the enemy's preparations and activities on the various fronts. He carried out several activities, the most important of which are:

a- Developing and making rapid progress in the field of monitoring (Module 2), which proved itself in the war, and establishing bases for this unit, which expanded greatly after the armistice agreements, in terms of financial allocations and manpower in various places in Israel to improve the quality of monitoring When necessary, tactical monitoring groups were formed and sent to forward bases.

B- Operation of Unit 131 and the flow of new blood in its veins, despite the fact that the unit was established from the outset to work only in times of emergency and carry out very special tasks.

C- Expansion and modernization of the intelligence department in the Air Force, which was only interested in resolving aerial photographs, and in return for putting the information-gathering apparatus on its feet, the building of the protection apparatus continued in the Intelligence Corps, whose main task was to ensure the security and confidentiality of new collection sources, and on the other hand, to prevent The leakage of information about the organization of the Israeli army to the enemy, and in this regard, focus has been placed on operating the military monitoring apparatus well on the one hand, and the field security department on the other hand.

The operation of Unit 131 and the establishment of monitoring bases was tantamount to pouring oil on the flame of tense relations between the Intelligence Department, headed by Benjamin Gebli, and the Mossad, headed by Isser Harel. 131 Without coordination with the Mossad, the attempt to limit and limit the scope of Military Intelligence activities failed, and the fact that Military Intelligence controlled the field of political research and assumed responsibility for evaluating National Intelligence gave it sufficient power to prevent any attempt to limit its activities.

The issue of the intelligence group in the Golan overthrew the head of the Intelligence Division, Benjamin Gebli. In May 1955, the Chief of Staff appointed Yehoshafat Harkabi as its new chief, and assigned him to investigate the roots and tails of what he called the scandal within Military Intelligence that led to damage to its prestige. He refused to investigate with them, and attributed that to reprisals and preoccupation with them, and threatened that if he did not stand up from the task of investigation, he would resign, so he was relieved of this task.

The first surprise for Harkabi was the announcement by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser on 9/27/1955 that Egypt had signed an arms deal with Czechoslovakia, which Israel saw as preparation for Egypt's attack on it. The deal was a complete surprise to the Military Intelligence Division, and accusations were also leveled against the Mossad. fail.

At that time, there was a controversy before the deal about the period of time needed by the Egyptians to move from Western weapons to Soviet weapons, and from Cherman tanks to T34 tanks, and the intelligence did not have any information about that.

Herkabi devoted part of his work to developing intelligence theory, considering that one of the functions of the head of the intelligence division should be the assessment of the ship's commander, i.e. providing the prime minister with a national intelligence assessment that includes information known as the "national intelligence assessment", and from here he adopted sending a daily intelligence note that he was writing himself to David Ben-Gurion.

In July 1985, a coup took place in Iraq that put an end to the monarchy, and Nuri al-Saeed was replaced by Abdul Karim Qassem, contrary to the belief of military intelligence that Abdul Rahman Aref would take over the reins of power. enough [13].

The issue of national assessment has gained increasing importance with the passage of time and formed the basis for monitoring and identifying future threats to the State of Israel and potential security and political changes regionally and internationally. During the past decades, the issuance of a semi-annual report by the Military Intelligence Division and an annual report depicting the end of each year has become a well-known tradition set by it. Division Research Department.

These reports are considered to have a political dimension at the Israeli level, as they play a role in determining the positions of the Israeli leadership. For example, the reports of the head of the research department in the Intelligence Division at the beginning of the current decade, Brigadier General Amos Gilad, played a key role in crystallizing the policy pursued by Ehud Barak, and after him Ariel. Sharon towards the late President Yasser Arafat, considering him a non-partner and launching a massive campaign against him that ended with the imposition of a siege on him and then poisoned him.

The assessment of my intelligence, which crystallized at the end of 2004 about the prospects for 2005, was touched upon by the military analyst, Ze'ev Schiff[14]. He indicated that "the year 2005" will be a year of fundamental changes with the end of Yasser Arafat's era and the rise of a new leadership. Another fundamental change is the decision of the government and the Knesset to adopt Ariel Sharon's disengagement plan and its impact on the confrontation and on Palestinian (terrorism). A third change is related to the assessment, which crystallized more strongly, that in the year 2005 Iran will reach independence in the production of radioactive materials in preparation for obtaining nuclear weapons. Another change concerns Syria, which is under pressure from the Security Council to complete the removal of its army from Lebanon.

In light of this assessment, Schiff concludes, “The potential positive aspects of change should not be ignored. For example, there is no war coalition against Israel, and today there is no opportunity to establish an “eastern front” against it. Dangerous countries that deal with weapons of mass destruction are on the defensive. Global jihad terrorism did not stop, but on the other hand, it repelled to a large extent the “national terrorism” directed against Israel. It can also be concluded that the Arab collective presence has weakened. It is therefore not surprising that the renewed intelligence assessment reached the conclusion that Israel's room for maneuver has expanded. How will Israel act in this field of maneuver, is a question not related to the intelligence men, but to the political leadership. royal, and successor and successor to the royal era, and successor and successor to the daily aria he used to fix himself to

The picture that Schiff presented differed from the intelligence assessment of AMAN for the year 2007, as presented by its president, Brigadier General Amos Yadlin, before the Israeli government session on 25/2/2007, where he said, “The strategic environment of the State of Israel is less stable than it used to be. There are negative contexts and there are more opportunities than in the past year. The extremist camp - Iran, Syria and Hezbollah - is strengthening. This camp believes that it has found the strategy to confront Israel: terrorism and military confrontation. The pragmatic elements in the Middle East are weakening. The military threats to Israel are diverse - on one side there is terrorism and on the other side there are surface-to-surface missiles and unconventional weapons.”[15]

Military intelligence against the resistance:

The first half of the fifties of the last century was marked by fedayeen operations against Israeli targets, which posed a tangible threat to the stability and security of the State of Israel. The village of Qibya for the operation of 14-15 October 1953, and the Chief of Staff at the time, Moshe Dayan, claimed responsibility for attacking civilian targets, which he called military places from which the perpetrators of the operations exit, and they are secured targets. Dayan assumed that[16]:

1. Arab countries bear responsibility for the operations that the perpetrators set off from and return to.

2. As a result of the retaliatory operations, Arab armies will appear to fight the entertainers to put against the security deterioration.

The intelligence agreed with these two assumptions and did not try to test the extent of its judgment throughout the period of retaliatory operations. The intelligence saw that there had been a shift in the Egyptians' attitude towards the operations of the infiltrating fedayeen. 2/1955, which led to the killing of 38 Egyptian officers and soldiers, as the Egyptians, after a restricted order, formed the Fedayeen Battalion.

A dispute arose between the head of the Intelligence Division, Yehoskat Harkabi, and the chief of staff, Moshe Dayan. The first saw that there was a shift in Egyptian policy, and the other said that this would be a shift only if we allow it. When the matter was presented to Ben-Gurion for resolution, he said that Harkabi was right, as the Egyptians had made a shift in their policies. Indeed, the intelligence did not object to the essence of the policy of revenge operations, as its role at the beginning was weak and focused on identifying the various aspects of order through the research department and the extent of the increase or decrease in the operations of the fedayeen[17].

The main intelligence role in the success of the revenge operations was played by the combat intelligence or the field agencies. Through the intelligence officers in the central, southern and northern regions, the forces that lost the retaliatory patrols were provided with the required information accurately.

The intelligence picture was the files of villages or potential targets in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and it included information about almost every Jordanian village, in the form of a file that contained aerial pictures of the target, ground pictures, and observation reports. The information was obtained through aerial reconnaissance operations, in addition to the pictures taken It was picked up by helicopters.

The retaliation operations carried out by Israel did not stop the activities of the Arab and Palestinian resistance, as it became routine. After every operation of the resistance, the expectation of an Israeli attack became commonplace. The resistance fighters studied the methods of work of the Israeli paratroopers and took counter measures that led to the establishment of the attack on the center Qalqilya night police 10-11 October 1956, when the attack was repulsed and heavy losses were inflicted among the members of the Israeli unit. Despite this, Israeli intelligence estimates went to the fact that these operations made an important contribution to increasing the prestige of the Israeli army in general, modernizing its methods of war, gaining combat experience, and making a significant improvement on The Combat Intelligence Service and the successful integration of all elements of information gathering at the civilian level [18].

Military Intelligence assassinates Mustafa Hafez and Fatah leaders in Beirut:

Israel held Major Mustafa Hafez, who assumed the position of Egyptian intelligence chief in the Gaza Strip, responsible for the resistance operations, which culminated in a series of violent attacks by fedayeen groups against Israeli settlements in the Negev in April 1956.

Muhammad Suleiman Talalqa was one of the agents who worked with Hafez and assigned him to contact the Israeli intelligence men and offered to work for them as a spy at a time when he was reporting everything to the person responsible for him. Lieutenant Lotfi Makkawi, through the book “Statistics and Man” by its author, Colonel Marshall Rondstadt, and he was not an agent, as confirmed by the Egyptian investigations after that. Hafez removed the cover of the book, and it exploded, injuring Hafez, Amr al-Hadidi’s deputy, and Talalqa. The three were taken to the hospital. Hafez died hours after the injury, and al-Hadidi and Talalqa recovered[19].

Military intelligence is credited with many assassinations that targeted political and military leaders of the uprising, including the assassination of the three leaders of the Fatah al-Shuhada movement, Abu Yusef al-Najjar, Kamal Adwan, and Kamal Nasser, by attacking their homes on Verdun-Beirut Street on 4/10/1974. Many Israeli sources indicated that Ehud Barak, who headed the Special Unit of the Chief of Staff at the time, took part in the operation and disguised himself as a woman.

Military Intelligence also assassinated the martyr Abu Jihad Khalil al-Wazir on April 16, 1988, in a complex operation. The operation was supervised by the Deputy Staff at the time, Ehud Barak, and Moshe Ya'alon, who was a member of the Special Unit of the General Staff, participated in the implementation.

In one of the operations in pursuit of those accused of carrying out the Munich operation, the Military Intelligence failed to assassinate Ahmed Salama, and its members killed a Moroccan waiter named Ahmed Bouchikhi in a pub in Lillehammer, Norway, on 7/26/1974. The Norwegian police arrested the intelligence group consisting of five People, and it turned out that the group was operating under the directives of the Israeli embassy in Oslo through the embassy's security officer[20].

Unit 8200, the electronic espionage arm of the Intelligence Division[21]:

The Israeli intelligence services rely on two main sources to collect the intelligence information necessary for their war against the Palestinian resistance movements, which are human resources, which are based on recruiting agents, whether they are agents not linked to specific organizations, or agents that they can plant within these organizations.

And electronic sources, which are based on the use of the latest high-technology. Just as there are sections within the main intelligence institutions in the Hebrew state that deal specifically with recruiting agents, there are also sections concerned with electronic espionage.

However, in everything related to electronic espionage, among the three Israeli intelligence services, which are the internal intelligence service “Shin Bet”, the Military Intelligence Division “Aman”, and the “Mossad” agency, the “Aman” agency stands out, with the main and decisive role in everything related to In this field of electronic espionage operations.

Three decades ago, the “Aman” agency, which is considered the largest Israeli intelligence agency, launched a specialized section in the field of electronic espionage, called “Unit 8200.” Retired General Uri Sagheh, the former head of the “Aman” agency, admitted the existence of such a unit. , which he considered one of the most important intelligence units in the Hebrew state, as General Uri Sagheh said that the objectives of “Unit 8200” is to contribute to providing an integrated intelligence vision with information provided by human sources based on agents.

The unit relies on three forms of work in the intelligence field: monitoring, eavesdropping, photography, and jamming. This type of task requires a wide range of advanced technology.

It is noteworthy that the Israeli military industries complex, which is owned by the government, is specially developing electronic devices based on special requests from those in charge of “Unit 8200”, which is commanded by a senior officer with the rank of brigadier general.

There are routine tasks carried out by “Unit 8200”, and over time this type of task does not require a special amount of development due to the Palestinian society’s inability to confront these technologies due to the wide disparity in the field of technical progress in this field.

Among these tasks: First: eavesdropping and monitoring:

Eavesdropping on wired and wireless communication devices is one of the basic tasks of the “8200” unit. Landline and mobile phones, and wireless devices are constantly eavesdropped. What helps the unit to fully perform its mission is the fact that the authorities are the ones who set up the communications network in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and therefore they do not need call pick-ups. Rather, the main exchanges of the Palestinian communications network are automatically linked to the Zionist communications network “Bezeq”. In addition, the only Palestinian mobile network operating in the Palestinian territories, known as “Jawwal”, relies on Israel for many of its services, in addition to signing an agreement with the Israeli “Orange” network for communications, which makes the unit “8200” no You need a lot of efforts to monitor phone calls.

As for the other wireless communication devices used in the Palestinian territories, especially the “Meretz” devices, they are purely Israeli devices, in addition to the dependence of thousands of Palestinians on Israeli mobile phone companies, such as Cellcom, Pelephone, and other companies.

Categories that are bugged:

1- Leaders and members of the resistance:

In order to monitor the movements of resistance elements from various organizations, Unit “8200” gives top priority to wiretapping the phones of resistance elements. So that the wiretapped material is used to build a security file for those whose calls are monitored, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the monitoring of these calls is used to thwart operations planned by the resistance movements.

In addition to using the content of these calls to determine the action taken against the elements of the resistance, whether it was assassination or arrest. As experience has shown, monitoring the calls by the unit helps the Israeli intelligence investigators with the resistance members when they are arrested, and presenting the evidence against them.

Here, it is necessary to point out a very important point, which is that when any member of the resistance is arrested, the occupation soldiers are keen to seize his mobile phone. And with a technique known to the technical experts working for “Unit 8200”, the content of all calls made or received by the owner of the mobile phone is obtained within a full month. A number of detainees testified that the contents of their calls were shown to them by intelligence interrogators during the investigation in order to force them to confess.

2- Authority leaders and officials:

The Israeli intelligence services show great interest in knowing what is going on in the corridors of power, in order to help the government take appropriate decisions in everything related to the relationship with the authority. The Hebrew newspapers quoted a security source as saying that “Unit 8200”, based on instructions from the leadership of the “Aman” apparatus, does not exclude any of the leaders, officials, and employees of its security services from systematic wiretapping operations.

The second channel[22] on Israeli television revealed that Sharon had succeeded in persuading President Bush to turn against Arafat in such a sweeping manner, when Sharon presented Bush talks to Arafat in which he asked the resistance fighters in the Fatah movement to continue the armed action against the authorities in The beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, and the contents of these calls were shown to many officials in Europe and some Arab countries that maintained relations with the Zionist authorities in order to excuse the Zionists for their current policy against the Palestinians.

3- Different segments of the people: the Israeli intelligence services are interested in knowing the trends of Palestinian public opinion. Hence, “Unit 8200” eavesdrops on the phones of many people in order to know the trends of public opinion, but it shows interest in eavesdropping on the calls of journalists and humanitarian workers. And Al-Ahly.

Second: Photography: The experience of the Al-Aqsa Intifada showed that photography is one of the most important vehicles of electronic espionage for the Hebrew state. Unit 8200 uses various techniques in imaging operations, which have become necessary in monitoring the movements of the Palestinian resistance, in addition to the contribution of imaging operations to improving the performance of the occupation forces in confrontations with the resistance. These cameras are linked to the leadership bodies in the Ministry of Defense and the Army Staff, where they inform the commanders of the army's branches responsible for the situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The imaging process is carried out using several techniques, the most famous of which are two prominent techniques, namely:

1- Installing large digital cameras on the tops of the mountains surrounding the Palestinian cities in the West Bank, and they are set up on special towers in front of the cities in the Gaza Strip. The operation of these cameras is supervised by members of “Unit 8200”, as the cameras are directed to the areas that the intelligence services want. And the Israeli army, the movements of the Palestinian resistance fighters.

The filming process is often considered a link in the chain of operations necessary to carry out assassination operations. The prominent Zionist journalist, Ben Caspit, revealed that this unit, “8200”, focuses these cameras on the homes and offices of the wanted persons, especially on the leaders of the Hamas movement, in the wake of the implementation of the “Isdod” martyrdom operation, after which the authorities decided to liquidate the leadership of the Hamas movement.

Caspit added that these cameras transmitted pictures of Hamas leaders while they were moving in their homes and in the streets of various Palestinian cities. At the same time, “Unit 8200” is installing cameras to monitor what is happening in the vicinity of the Jewish settlements, or along the line separating the Gaza Strip and the West Bank on the one hand, and the occupation state.

2- The use of drones: This technology is exploited in cooperation between “Unit 8200” and the Israeli Air Force. Gen. Dan Halutz, Deputy Chief of Staff, and former Air Force Commander, indicated that in all the assassination operations that took place in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, this aircraft produced by the Israeli Military Industries Complex was used.

This aircraft is used to facilitate the mission of the infantry brigades of the occupation army before and during incursions into the Palestinian territories. The units, which are operated by air commanders located in the vicinity of Tel Aviv, survey the areas where the army intends to penetrate and provide the members of “Unit 8200” with information about the movements of the resistance elements, and the members of the unit, in turn, provide the army commanders with this information firsthand.

These planes are used to survey the southern borders of the Gaza Strip, calling for monitoring arms smuggling operations between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. According to “Al-Istiqlal” magazine, one of the supplements to “Yedioth Ahronoth” newspaper, issued on 4/26/2004, these planes are also used to carry out assassination operations, as they are equipped with special missiles that are fired at people nominated for liquidation. In this way, the “8200” unit becomes, in addition to being an electronic intelligence arm, that carries out operations with practical field missions.

The unit prepares for the post-disengagement phase:

On the other hand, it appears that the Israeli army has assigned “Unit 8200” to make the necessary arrangements to ensure that Israel continues to know what is going on in the Gaza Strip after the implementation of the “disengagement” plan, and the withdrawal of its army from it. According to a report in the “Foreign Report” magazine “Unit 8200 has planted listening devices, cameras and mines in various sensitive areas of the Strip.

According to a report in its latest issue, at a time when the Israeli military establishment is preparing for a possible withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the Military Intelligence Division “AMAN”, and in particular “Unit 8200”, has redoubled its efforts in this operation.

According to the magazine, AMAN worked with all its might to plant the latest digital spying devices in the Strip before the army left, in order to place the Palestinian factions, or rather their activists, under permanent Zionist surveillance, and to transfer any information directly to AMAN headquarters in Tel Aviv.

The first change that Unit 8200 will make, according to Foreign Report, is to plant hidden cameras in central locations in the Strip, which will be directly linked to live monitoring stations inside Israel, operating around the clock.

In the event that there are activities that the Israeli intelligence deems “suspicious,” such as preparing to launch missiles at Jewish cities, this information is transmitted via computer communication to squadrons of attack helicopters that will be ready to carry out the attack on the target in Gaza.

The magazine adds that the process of implanting cameras that withstand all weather fluctuations and works day and night takes months, especially since the main work in it is to install these cameras secretly and hide them in ways that are difficult for the Palestinians to discover.

As for the second change, it will be represented in planting listening devices in the main buildings, such as the offices of the authority or the various factions. This is not a small task, but rather a very big one, according to the "Foreign Report", as the authorities plan to control and monitor all telephone lines and communication systems in the Strip in a way that enables the Israeli security services to monitor the movements and communications of activists.

It is planned to complete these two operations in the month of March next - that is, with the start of the withdrawal process, which is scheduled to end in September 2005.

Foreign Report confirms that some of the Israeli incursions into the Rafah area in southern Gaza and other areas, which are known to have a large presence of Palestinian activists there, were not military objectives but a cover for this massive intelligence operation.

Chapter Four: The Administrative and Organizational Structure of the Intelligence Division[23]:

The Presidency of Military Intelligence consists of the following sections:

1.Production

2. The Spy Corps

3. External relations

4. Field security and military oversight

First: the production department

Responsible for preparing the national intelligence estimates, and he submits daily intelligence reports and bulletins that contain raw information or information that is partially analyzed.

The department is headed by the Deputy Director of Military Intelligence and includes the following departments.

1- Geographical unit (or regional)

2- Functional (or tactical) unit

3- Documentation unit (or registration and records)

Second: The Spy Corps

It is divided into the following units:

1- Information collection unit

2- The General Presidency Center, which is the unit responsible for the Military Intelligence School, along with technological development, communications and maps.

3- Training

4- Organization, supply lines and personnel affairs

5- Research and development

Third: Department of External Relations:

This department is responsible for foreign relations between the Israeli army and other armies. It is also responsible for all military attachés and their affairs.

Fourth: Field Security and Military Oversight Department

Responsible for combating espionage and uses field units to maintain law and order and is divided into four commands:

1- The northern region

2- The central region

3- The southern region

4- Jerusalem

5- Tel Aviv

6- Haifa

Air Force Intelligence and Maritime Intelligence:

Nautical and Air Intelligence are small, highly specialized units that focus on issues of direct interest to them, ie those of interest to the Naval and Air Command.

The Director of Air Force Intelligence and Naval Intelligence participate in the meetings of the Director of Military Intelligence, and the intelligence officers of these two agencies participate in the periodic meetings of the Research Department so that the responsibility for reporting can be coordinated.